Articles Posted in Non-Profit Organizations

iStock_000010997373XSmall-300x300We previously discussed whether nonprofit organizations and for-profit businesses can use unpaid interns without violating the Fair Labor Standards Act (or FLSA).  We also discussed allegations of violations of the FLSA related to unpaid interns in the fashion industry.

Earlier this year, the Department of Labor revised its policy, known as Fact Sheet #71, for determining whether businesses may use unpaid interns. The old 2010 policy used a six-factor test, with the presence of all six factors required in order businesses to use unpaid interns without violating the FLSA. The new 2018 policy considers the following seven factors to determine whether the business or the intern is the primary beneficiary of the internship.

  1. The extent to which the intern and the employer clearly understand that there is no expectation of compensation. Any promise of compensation, express or implied, suggests that the intern is an employee—and vice versa.

On June 20, 2018, USA Gymnastics (“USAG”) suspended Alex Naddour, member of the 2016 U.S. Olympics team in men’s gymnastics and a member of the current Senior National Team, pending the resolution of allegations of sexual misconduct. His suspension prohibits him from participating in any USAG activities.

The United States Olympic Committee (“USOC”) is responsible for, among other things, establishing programs to develop world class athletes in the Olympic sports. To that end, USOC has designated 47 organizations as national governing bodies (“NGBs”), each with responsibility for one or more sports. USAG, a nonprofit corporation headquartered in Indianapolis, is the NGB for several types of gymnastics.

USOC and several NGBs, particularly USAG, have come under fire over the last several years for failing to protect athletes, in particular to protect female athletes from sexual abuse. The best known case is that of Larry Nassar, formerly USAG’s national team doctor, who, earlier this year, was sentenced to 40 to 175 years in prison for criminal sexual misconduct against female gymnasts, most or all of whom were minors at the time.

iStock-621263016-300x97We previously discussed the Business Entity Harmonization Bill (Senate Enrolled Act 443 or P.L. 118-2017) passed last year by the General Assembly in the following posts:

iStock-621263016-300x97[March 3, 2018. The General Assembly amended some of the provisions created the Business Entity Harmonization Bill, as discussed in a Postscript to this series.]

This is the last in four-part series. The first three parts are here: here, here, and here.

This Part IV describes some flaws of Senate Enrolled Act 443 that we ran across while writing the first three parts.  We hope the General Assembly will address them, either in the 2018 session or another.

iStock-621263016-300x97[March 3, 2018. The General Assembly amended some of the provisions created the Business Entity Harmonization Bill, as discussed in a Postscript to this series.]

This is the second of a four-part series discussing the Business Entity Harmonization Bill passed by the Indiana General Assembly in 2017. An overview of the bill is provided in Part I.

Senate Enrolled Act 443 creates, effective as of January 1, 2018, a new Article 0.5 in Title 23 of the Indiana Code, the Uniform Business Organizations Code, that includes a number of provisions that apply to Indiana business corporations (including professional corporations and benefit corporations, but excluding insurance companies), limited liability companies (LLCs, including series LLCs), limited partnerships (LPs), limited liability partnerships (LLPs), and nonprofit corporations, eliminating a number of inconsistencies between similar provisions for different types of entities. The following discussion is a brief description of some of the more important provisions, drawing attention to new or substantially changed provisions.

iStock-621263016-300x97[March 3, 2018. The General Assembly amended some of the provisions created the Business Entity Harmonization Bill, as discussed in a Postscript to this series.]

Indiana law provides for several types of business and nonprofit entities, each of which is governed by one or more articles of Title 23 of the Indiana Code, all of which require similar filings with the Indiana Secretary of State, and all of which are capable of undergoing transactions such as mergers and conversions into other types of entities. The types of entities and the governing portions of Title 23 are:

iStock-91632872-244x300Although the tax reform bill just passed by the U.S. House of Representatives retains the income tax deduction for individuals who make contributions to charitable organizations (i.e., organizations that are tax exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code), it may nonetheless have significant effects on the amount of charitable giving by Americans. The reason lies in the increase in the standard tax deduction for individuals and the elimination of other deductions.

Increasing the Standard Deduction

The tax code provides several types of deductions that reduce the amount of tax owed by individual taxpayers, including deductions for home mortgage interest and contributions to charitable organizations. However, the tax code also provides a minimum “standard deduction” for taxpayers who have less than that amount in itemized deductions. Taxpayers who itemize deductions receive a tax benefit by making a charitable contribution, but not those who take the standard deduction. For example, the after-tax cost of a $100 contribution by most itemizing taxpayers in the 25% tax bracket is only $75. For taxpayers who take the standard deduction, the cost of a $100 contribution is $100 in both before- and after-tax dollars.

[This post is one in a series written by Smith Rayl’s newest member, Rose Shingledecker.]

Earlier this month, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Doermer v. Callen, No. 15-3734 (7th Cir. Feb. 1, 2017). In a previous post, we reviewed the facts and explored what the case had to say about the board of directors and directors’ terms. Today we’ll inch closer to the issue at the center of the case: whether a non-member director of an Indiana nonprofit corporation has standing to bring derivative claims on behalf of the corporation.

But before getting to derivative claims, let’s consider what it means to be a member of a nonprofit corporation. Perhaps you’ve made a donation to a nonprofit in your community and been recognized as an “annual member” for your contribution. Generally it is okay for an organization to refer to its donors and other people who support the organization as members. However, these types of donor membership programs usually do not grant the donor legal or statutory membership in an organization.

[This post was authored by Smith Rayl’s newest member, Rose Shingledecker.]

Last week, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Doermer v. Callen, No. 15-3734 (7th Cir. Feb. 1, 2017), a case that illustrates and implicates several important aspects of Indiana nonprofit corporation law. Over the next few posts, we’ll explore some of the key aspects of the case and what it has to say about Indiana nonprofit law.  First up: the board of directors and directors’ terms.

At the center of the case is the Doermer Family Foundation, Inc., a nonprofit corporation formed under the Indiana Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1991 (the “Act”). The initial board of directors consisted of a father; a mother; their son, Richard Doermer; and daughter, Kathryn Callen. Each initial director had a lifetime appointment.

gavel-1238036Last July, the Indiana Court of Appeals decided Rogers v. State, 60 N.E.3d 256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), in which the attorney for a criminal defendant had deposed an employee of a charitable organization who held a degree in social work from an accredited university but not a license from the Behavioral Health and Human Services Licensing Board of the Indiana Professional Licensing Agency. The attorney for the organization advised the social worker not to answer certain questions on the grounds that the information was subject to the privilege for communications between a social worker and her client.  The defendant filed a motion to compel the social worker to answer the questions, and the court denied the motion. The court gave the defendant permission to file an interlocutory appeal with the Indiana Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the privilege does not apply to unlicensed social workers. The State sought transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court, which held oral argument before denying transfer.  Because transfer was denied, the decision of the Court of Appeals is now final.

Ind. Code 23‑25.6‑6-1 provides that, with some exceptions, a “counselor” cannot be compelled to disclose communications with a client.  Counselor is defined by Ind. Code 25‑23.6‑1‑3.8 as “a social worker, a clinical social worker, a marriage and family therapist, a mental health counselor, an addiction counselor, or a clinical addiction counselor who is licensed under this article.”  The question put to the Court of Appeals was one of statutory interpretation:  Does the phrase “who is licensed under this article” apply to all six professions in the list, or does it apply only to the last one, clinical addition counselors?

In arguing that the modifying phrase applied only to the last item in the list, the State relied in part on a canon of statutory construction (i.e., a rule a court sometimes uses as a guideline for interpreting statutes) called the doctrine of the last antecedent, which says that when a list of nouns is followed by a modifier, the modifier is presumed to apply only to the last one in the list (i.e., the “last antecedent”) unless there is a comma between the last item and the modifier.  Because there is no comma between “clinical addiction counselor” and “who is licensed under this article,” the State argued, the phrase does not apply to “social worker.” Therefore, an unlicensed social worker is within the definition of “counselor;” and the privilege applies.